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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that an ex post facto justification will suffice if judicial action is initiated
under section five.6
9
The Court's pragmatic approach to annexations is not without
merit. The attainment of power by blacks in a city that is no longer
economically viable is an empty victory. However, in its eagerness to
afford relief to beleaguered cities, the Court seriously undercut the
power of section five. The burden of proof concerning the question of
discriminatory purpose has become meaningless. By ignoring pre-annex-
ation minority political influence, the Court has invited that influence to
be diluted. Politicians in the states and subdivisions covered by section
five can no longer successfully prevent blacks from voting. However,
annexations may become one method of preventing blacks from winning
or deciding elections. The promise of full voting rights is an elusive one
if it is subject to manipulations of this kind. In the wake of the violence
at Selma, Alabama, President Johnson urged Congress to enact voting
rights legislation. The President stated, "No law we now have on the
books . .. can ensure the right to vote when local officials are
determined to deny it." °70 The Richmond decision serves notice to local
officials determined to prevent blacks from wielding real power that
there is now no law that prevents annexations from being used to dilute
the political influence of blacks.
BRIAN A. POvERS
Constitutional Law-The Establishment Clause: Drawing the
Line on Aid to Religious Schools
Since its first ruling on an establishment clause1 challenge to state
aid to religious schools,' the United States Supreme Court has sought to
69. Annexations are often viewed as a safety valve for our larger cities. This
decision will also affect much smaller cities eager to add white voters for their tax dollars
and their votes. Perkins involved the expansion efforts of Canton, Mississippi, a town
with a 1970 census of 10,703; Petersburg involved Petersburg, Virginia, a city with a
1970 population of 36,103.
70. See Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 5.
1. The establishment clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The establishment clause was
presumed applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment in Everson, supra at 15,
and has subsequently been expressly applied to the states. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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apply the Jeffersonian view of the first amendment as "a wall of
separation between church and state."' Implementing this separation,
the Court has developed the following three-pronged test to be applied
to challenged state assistance:4 the aid statute must have a secular
legislative purpose;5 its "primary effect" must neither inhibit nor ad-
vance religion;6 and the statute must not involve government in "exces-
sive entanglement" with religious matters or institutions.7 In Meek v.
Pittinger8 the Court applied these tests but reached conclusions as to the
various forms of aid being challenged that cannot be reconciled under
an even-handed application of the tests.
Plaintiffs in Meek9 brought suit in federal district court' 0 seeking
to enjoin expenditure of funds under two Pennsylvania statutes" that
mandated state aid to "nonpublic schools."' 2 The challenged aid was
divided into four classifications: "auxiliary services,"1 3 "instructional
equipment," "instructional materials" and "textbooks.' 4 Plaintiffs con-
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
4. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. Id.; see School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
6. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
7. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Another consideration, poten-
tial for political devisiveness, may be considered a fourth test, though it has not yet been
elevated to that level by the Court. This consideration was the focus of Mr. Justice
Brennan's dissent, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall joined, in
Meek v. Pittinger, 95 S. Ct. 1753, 1767 (1975).
8. 95 S. Ct. 1753 (1975).
9. Plaintiffs were three individual resident taxpayers of Pennsylvania and four
organizations with resident taxpayer members. Standing was granted to both groups with
respect to their establishment clause claims under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
(first amendment challenge by taxpayer with standing granted) and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (organization has standing to represent injured members)
respectively. Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The Supreme
Court affirmed standing of all parties, 95 S. Ct. at 1758 n.5.
10. Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1974). A three-judge district
court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 9-972, -973 (1975).
12. Id. § 9-972(b) defines a "nonpublic school" as: "[Any school, other than a
public school within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, wherein a resident of the
Commonwealth may legally fulfill the compulsory school attendance requirements of this
act and which meet the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public
Law 88-352)."
13. Id. defines "auxiliary services" as:
[G]uidance, counseling and testing services; psychological services; serv-
ices for exceptional children; remedial and therapeutic services; speech and
hearing services; services for the improvement of the educationally disadvan-
taged . . . .and such other secular, neutral, non-ideological services as are of
benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided for
public school children of the Commonwealth.
14. Id. § 9-973(b) defines the following terms:
"Instructional equipment" means instructional equipment, other than fixtures
annexed to and forming part of the real estate, which is suitable for and to
be used by children and/or teachers. The term includes but is not limited to
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tended that expenditures under the statutes 5 violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment and deprived unconsenting taxpayers of
their rights under the free exercise clause.
Applying the tripartite test previously developed by the Supreme
Court,' the three-judge district court upheld all of the statutory classes
of aid except "instructional equipment"' 7 that could be diverted to reli-
gious purposes.' 8 On direct appeal 9 the Supreme Court reversed, up-
holding only the textbook provision.
20
The Pennsylvania programs were invalidated on two grounds.
First, the Court observed that seventy-five percent of the schools eligible
to receive aid were sectarian in nature and that their secular and
religious functions were "inextricably intertwined.' Characterizing in-
structional materials and equipment as "massive aid,"' the Court con-
cluded that the aid to the sectarian institutions had the unconstitutional
"primary effect' '23 of advancing religion. Secondly, the Court invalidat-
ed the auxiliary services provision by holding that an "intolerable
projection equipment, recording equipment, laboratory equipment, and any
other educational secular, neutral, non-ideological materials as may be of bene-
fit to the instruction of non-public school children and are presently or here-
after provided for public school children of the Commonwealth.
"Instructional materials" means books, periodicals, documents, pamphlets,
photographs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic works, musical scores, maps,
charts, globes, sound recordings, including but not limited to those on discs and
tapes, processed slides, transparencies, films, filmstrips, kinescopes, and video.
tapes, or any other printed and published materials of a similar nature....
The term includes such other secular, neutral, non-ideological materials as are
of benefit to the instruction of nonpublic school children and are presently or
hereafter provided for public school children. ...
"Textbooks" means books, workbooks, including reusable and nonreusable
workbooks, and manuals, whether bound or in looseleaf form, intended for use
as a principal source or study material for a given class or group of students,
a copy of which is expected to be available for the individual use of each pupil
in such class or group. Such textbooks shall be textbooks which are acceptable
for use in any public, elementary, or secondary school of the Commonwealth.
15. Id. §§ 9-972, -973.
16. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. 374 F. Supp. at 661. The district court found no merit in the plaintiffs' free
exercise claim since taxes resulting from the expenditures in question had no real effect
on free exercise rights. Id. at 662.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) allows direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a
judgment of a three-judge district court concerning the constitutionality of a state law.
20. 95 S. Ct. at 1767. The Court was badly divided, with Stewart (writing for the
Court), Blackmun, and Powell in the majority as to all statutory provisions. Burger,
Rehnquist and White dissented except as to the upholding of the textbook loan program.
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall joined with the Court except as to the upholding of the
textbook program.
21. Id. at 1764, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
22. 95 S. Ct. at 1763.
23. Id. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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degree of entanglement2V4 between church and state" would result in
overseeing the program's administration.
25
The Court found the textbook provision to be identical "in every
material respect" 6 to the program approved in Board of Education v.
Allen2 7 seven years earlier, and upheld it on that basis alone. In doing so,
the majority did not subject this particular program to the analysis that it
applied to the other provisions.28 Distinguishing between the forms of
assistance in this manner, the Court apparently tried to achieve govern-
mental neutrality without depriving either the state legislature of the
right to benefit its citizens or parents of the right to exercise their reli-
gious beliefs.
In order to understand the principles applied in Meek, it is neces-
sary to examine the earlier cases that dealt with the establishment clause
limitations on state involvement with religious matters. Everson v. Board
of Education9 was the first Supreme Court decision to deal with the
establishment clause in the context of state aid to religious schools. In
Everson the Court held that the reimbursement of parents of the costs of
busing their children to parochial schools was only incidentally benefi-
cial to the sectarian schools since it was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
welfare statute analogous to police and fire protection.30 The Everson
rationale has since become known as the "pupil benefit theory."31 In
Board of Education v. Allen3" the Court extended the pupil benefit
theory to include secular textbooks provided directly to all school chil-
dren through expenditures of state funds.
A competing line of cases approached the state aid problem by
developing and relying primarily upon the three-part test. In School
District of Abington v. Schempp,3 though not a state assistance case,
24. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
25. 95 S. Ct. at 1765.
26. Id. at 1761.
27. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
28. 95 S. Ct. at 1760-62.
29. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In 1899 the Court upheld federal construction grants to a
hospital administered by a religious order, thus rejecting the view that the establishment
clause of the first amendment prohibits any form of financial aid to religious institutions.
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
30. 330 U.S. at 17. The Court further stated that in guarding against intrusion
upon Establishment Clause principles "we must be careful. . . that we do not inadvert-
ently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens
." Id. at 16. This dictum expresses the crux of the problem in Meek as well.
31. Note, Establishment Clause of the First Amendment-Free Textbook Loans to
Pupils in Private Schools Held Constitutional, 37 FoRDHAM L. Rnv. 123, 124 (1969).
32. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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the Court set forth two criteria by which a statute should be tested
under the establishment clause. These criteria were the requirements of
"secular purpose" and "primary effect. '8 4
In Lemon v. Kurtzman35 the Court added the requirement that the
aid program not involve "excessive entanglement '8 6 of church and state.
Under this third test, state salary supplements to teachers of secular
subjects were invalidated. The Court in Kurtzman held that entangle-
ment of government and religion would result from the state's ensuring
that teachers who received the supplement remained religiously neu-
tral.37 The Kurtzman Court also developed a fourth consideration,
potential for political division along religious lines, which, though not
given the weight of the other tests, was deemed a "warning signal"' 8 of
unconstitutionality.
The conflict inherent in the principles that were the basis of
Everson and Schempp did not go unnoticed by the Court. In Walz v.
Tax Commission 0 the Court upheld real property tax exemptions grant-
ed by New York to religious organizations. Though the rationale for the
decision was the incidental nature of the benefit to religion, which was
comparable to fire and police protection, 40 the Court paid particular
attention to the inconsistency in the developing case law. The Court
observed that inconsistencies in the opinions of the Court derived from
"too sweeping utterances on aspects of these [religion] clauses that
seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning
as general principles." 41
The Court in Walz suggested that the struggle to establish neutrali-
ty was one of finding a "neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses. 42 The source of the conflict, the Court concluded, lay in the
34. 374 U.S. at 222. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra. The requirement of
valid "secular purpose" is the least stringent requirement of the tripartite test because of
the difficulty in refuting the argument that aid is provided to benefit primarily the state's
citizens. Aid statutes may preempt the problem by placing statements of policy in the
statute's preamble. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AN. tit. 24, §§ 9-972(a), -973(a) (1975).
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
36. Id. at 613. See text accompanying note 7 supra. The Court has applied the
various tests with far less severity when the institution involved is one of higher
education and where the Court can take notice of a free academic atmosphere. See Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
37. 403 U.S. at 620-21.
38. Id. at 625.
39. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
40. Id. at 676. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. 397 U.S. at 668. Though Walz is not a state aid to religion case, the
establishment/free exercise clause principles involved are identical.
42. Id.
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fact that the religion clauses "are cast in absolute terms, . . . either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." 3 Because the Meek decision rested on both the pupil benefit
theory as to textbooks and the tripartite test as to the other programs, it
was inevitable that it would show the strains of the conflict delineated in
Walz.
An analysis of the Meek case must begin with an examination of
the manner in which the tripartite test was extended to cover the
invalidated provisions.4 The auxiliary services program4 5 was invali-
dated because the Court felt that in order for the state to guarantee
teacher autonomy from religious authorities, it would necessarily be-
come excessively entangled with those authorities. Though Lemon v.
Kurtzman4" was used as authority for this portion of the holding, the
teachers in Meek were chosen by the state for special functions associat-
ed more with health-related services than with regular classroom activ-
ites.4 7 The Court noted these differences but gave them little weight in
its factual analysis.4" This approach to excessive entanglement extended
the Court's invalidating power beyond the Kurtzman case to situations
that present very little danger of actual "fostering of religion."'49
The Court likewise changed its means of determining whether a
statute has the primary effect" of advancing religion. In the past,
programs were held to violate the establishment clause only if the
character of the aid was such that religion would be directly advanced
thereby, as when a statute authorized assistance without expressly limit-
ing it to nonreligious uses.5' In Meek the Court declared aid to be
impermissible when it exceeds an acceptable quantitative limit. The
instructional materials and equipment programs were struck, not be-
cause they could be diverted for religious use,52 but because they
43. Id. at 668-69.
44. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
45. See note 13 supra.
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. See note 13 supra.
48. See 95 S. Ct. at 1766.
49. Id. The Court noted in dicta that speech and hearing services of a "diagnostic"
character were probably constitutional but found that clause nonseverable from the
invalid section, even though a severability clause was present in the statute. Id. at 1766
n.21.
50. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
51. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). See also Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1763. The district court had based its test on whether or not aid
could be diverted to relligious purposes. The court invalidated only that portion that could
be so diverted. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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constituted "massive aid."53 This development extended the "primary
effect" limitation to cover state assistance that is suspect both in charac-
ter and in quantity.
The Court did not make clear its reasons for exempting the text-
book provision from the tripartite test. "[S]ubstantial amounts of direct
support" was the stated concern of the Court.54 There is, however, no
indication in the holding or in dicta why textbooks were not considered
"substantial" assistance, except that in Allen55 a similar provision was
upheld. Likewise, Mr. Justice Brennan's argument in his dissent that the
textbooks were going in fact to the school and not to the students
remains unanswered.56 In short, the textbooks seem to be direct aid to
the nonpublic schools and appear no less "substantial" than the other
provisions.
On the other hand, if the Everson approach (treating textbooks as
primarily benefiting the pupil) is used, the textbook program is justifia-
ble. The Court did in fact use the pupil benefit theory to support the
textbook provision in Meek. 57 Using Everson and Allen as starting
points, it is difficult to justify the striking of the instructional materials
program as unconstitutional. No explanation was given by the Court as
to why it distinguished between aid that provided textbooks, which was
held constitutional, and aid that provided "books, periodicals, docu-
ments, pamphlets" etc.,58 which was not. On the basis of the nature of
the materials, no rational distinction can be made. 9 To retain consisten-
cy the Court should have either upheld at least the auxiliary materials
under the pupil benefit theory 0 or struck the textbook provision under
53. 95 S. Ct. at 1763.
54. Id.
55. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
56. Brennan argued that the loan procedures and the language of the administrative
guidelines show that the loans are in fact made to the schools, not the children, 95 S. Ct.
at 1770-71.
57. Id. at 1761.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-973 (1975). Choice of materials and administrative
distribution procedure remained with the state as was the case with the textbooks.
59. Rehnquist made this observation: "I fail to see how the instructional materials
and equipment program can be distinguished [from the textbook program] in any
significant respect. Under both programs 'ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State'." 95 S. Ct. at 1776.
60. Though the Court claims the distinction lies in the fact that the instructional
materials program was "direct" aid to schools and the textbook program was not, it is
highly doubtful that if the aid had been given directly to students that it would have been
upheld. Both Brennan and Rehnquist in separate dissents and for different reasons show
that the "direct" aid argument of the majority is simply a makeshift one. See id. at 1770-
71, 1776.
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the tripartite test. The Court chose instead to sacrifice internal consisten-
cy.
The origin of the inconsistency lies primarily in the case law that
preceded Meek and in the conflicting interests present within any con-
cept of government neutrality. If in striving for neutrality government
becomes the adversary of religion, free exercise rights will be adversely
affected."1 This struggle for neutrality is the cause of the Court's ac-
knowledgment in Meek that the lines between permissible and im-
permissible aid are blurred and that the various tests are little more
than guidelines.62
Apparently not wanting to cut off all state power to benefit citizens
who exercise their religious rights, the Court stood on the precedential
authority of the "pupil benefit" cases. Additionally, fearful of increasing
state entanglement in religious affairs and of fueling political division on
religious grounds, the Court drew the line, albeit somewhat arbitrarily,
as to the extent of permissible state aid. The result of the clash between
these competing considerations was the inconsistency in the Court's
treatment of the aid provisions in Meek.
The Meek decision is significant because it made relatively clear
the line between permissible and impermissible aid. While affirming the
constitutionality of state aid that supplies busing,63 textbooks,6 4 health
care and lunches, 5 the Court further raised the barrier to state aid not
within these protected classes of assistance. As a result, state legisla-
tures should be forewarned that it is unlikely that the Court will ap-
prove state assistance to religious schools66 unless it comes within or
is closely associated with one of the protected classes.
It is unfortunate that the Court ignored its own statement on aid
classifications: state assistance is invalid if aimed at the "primary,
religious-oriented educational function of the sectarian school. ' 61 In this
61. This struggle for neutrality is the struggle described in Walz. See text accompa-
nying notes 41-42 supra.
62. 95 S. Ct. at 1760.
63. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), had upheld transportation cost
reimbursement to parents, and was noted with approval by the Court in Meek. 95 S. Ct.
at 1760.
64. 95 S. CL at 1762-63, afj'g Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65. In dicta the Court in Meek noted that health care and school lunches are
permissible aid, 95 S. Ct. 1763. Likewise, the Court noted that "speech and hearing
services" would have been upheld if severable from the remainder of the auxiliary
services program. Id. at 1766 n.21.
66. "Religious schools" in this context refers to primary and secondary religious
schools. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), shows a less strict approach to
institutions of higher learning administered by religious groups. See note 35 supra.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 1763.
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rough formula the Court posed a reasonable answer to the religious aid
issue. Lunches, health care and transportation can be upheld under the
pupil benefit theory as not being part of the actual educational function
that the Court has found to be "inextricably intertwined"' 8 with religion.
Textbooks, however, are an inseparable part of the primary educational
function of schools and should have been invalidated. Though this
approach would require the bolder actions of overruling Board of
Education v. Allen 9 and striking the textbook program in Meek, it
would more clearly establish the lines of state neutrality without requir-
ine the sacrifice of consistency.
ERIC NEWMAN
Criminal Procedure-Prison Escapee's Pending Appeal
Dismissed Despite Early Recapture
Escape from prison or other official custody is not only a common-
law' or statutory2 offense but it can also be a ground for major proce-
dural disabilities. Summary dismissal of the pending appeal of a prison
escapee or other fugitive from justice, at least while the appellant is still
at large, is accepted practice in many appellate courts.3 The result of this
procedure is a total preclusion of review of an escaping prisoner's
original conviction. In Estelle v. Dorrough4 the United States Supreme
Court extended its approval of this practice twofold by holding that a
Texas statute5 that allowed the automatic dismissal of an escaping
68. Id. at 1764, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971). See text
accompanying note 21 supra.
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
1. United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Smith v. State, 145 Me. 313, 75 A.2d 538 (1950); State v. Pace, 192 N.C. 780,
136 S.E. 11 (1926).
2. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-45 (1973); TEx. PENAL CODE art. 38.07 (1974).
3. See text accompanying notes 32-41 infra.
4. 420 U.S. 534 (1975) (per curiam).
5. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.09 (1966). This statute provides:
If the defendant, pending an appeal in the felony case, makes his escape
from custody, the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals shall no longer
attach in the case. Upon the fact of such escape being made to appear, the
court shall, on motion of the State's attorney, dismiss the appeal; but the order
dismissing the appeal shall be set aside if it is made to appear that the defend-
ant has voluntarily returned within ten days to the custody of the officer from
whom he escaped; and in cases where the punishment inflicted by the jury is
death or confinement in an institution operated by the Department of Correc-
